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Abstract:  
This paper explores the role of the birth control pill on divorce. To identify its effect, we 
use a quasi experiment exploiting the differences in the language of the Comstock anti-
obscenity statutes approved in the 1800s and early 1900s in the US. Results suggest that 
banning the sales of oral contraceptive methods has a negative impact on divorce. These 
findings are robust to alternative specifications and controls for observed (such as 
female labour force participation, or changes in the early legal access to the birth control 
pill) and unobserved state-specific factors, and time-varying factors at the state level. 
Additional analysis, developed to examine whether the impact of subsequent divorce 
law reforms on divorce is modified after controlling for the birth control pill effect, 
shows that, although sales bans matter, the impact of divorce law reforms on divorce 
rate does not vary. 
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I. Introduction 
Much recent research on divorce has concentrated on the impact of divorce law reforms 
on the evolution of the US divorce rate, in the main finding a positive relationship 
between liberalization of the laws and the divorce rate, (Friedberg 1998; Wolfers 2006; 
González-Val and Marcén 2011). Although the introduction of reforms may, at least in 
part, explain the acceleration of the US divorce rate since the late 1960s, such reforms 
have little to do with the rise in the divorce rate since the late 1950s. Researchers have 
looked at alternative explanations of this increase in divorce: the effect of major wars, 
(South 1985; Anderson and Little 1999), economic changes (Nunley 2010), and 
variations in female economic empowerment and in female labour force participation 
(Bremmer and Kesselring 2004; Nunley and Kietz 2009), among others. This paper 
presents evidence suggesting that the advent of the birth control pill also played an 
important role. 
We are not the first to empirically analyze the impact of the birth control pill on 
divorce but, there is no existing literature that has examined this issue by considering 
sales bans of the birth control pill. Prior research papers have identified the impact of 
oral contraception on divorce by focusing on legal variations in early access to the birth 
control pill only among young, unmarried women, using US data (Goldin and Katz 
2002; Nunley and Kietz 2009). Goldin and Katz (2002) find that access to the pill has a 
negative effect on the share of college women currently divorced (using data from the 
1970, 1980 and 1990 US Census), and they find that access to the birth control pill 
increases the quality of the match by raising the age at first marriage, which allows 
individuals to sort themselves better at marriage. Variations in the law reforms granting 
early access to the pill were also utilized by Nunley and Kietz (2009) to construct an 
index of pill access among young women in order to analyse the effect of the pill on the 
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US divorce rate from 1929 to 2006. In this case, they find a positive relationship 
between pill access and the divorce rate, but this effect is difficult to interpret since they 
do not distinguish in their sample between those couples married prior to or after the 
changes in state laws regarding contraceptive access. This is relevant because it is not 
clear whether their results are driven by a sub-population, those married before the 
reforms, who were not affected by changes in the law. Also using US time-series data, 
but only from 1920 to 1974, Michael (1998) suggests that the diffusion of the pill and 
intrauterine devices can help to explain the growth in the US divorce rate since the 
1960s. Similarly, Smith (1997) shows that the diffusion of the pill accounts for a 
significant portion of divorce actions in Great Britain. 
Why do sales bans of the birth control pill matter? Bans on sales slow the 
diffusion of oral contraception (Bailey, 2010), then, for women (and not only young 
women) living in states without legal restrictions, the situation of divorce is more 
attractive, since the pill allows them to more easily decide whether and when to have 
children and maintain their attachment to the labour force (Smith 1997; Goldin and Katz 
2000 and 2002).  
In our empirical analysis, we use state-level data on divorce rates from 1950 to 
2000. To identify the role of the birth control pill, we exploit the differences in the legal 
language of Comstock statutes that regulate sales bans of contraceptives, and the timing 
of the Griswold decision, which allowed states to repeal those sales bans (see, Bailey 
2010, for a review). We find that divorce rates in states with sales bans are significantly 
lower than those without sales bans, after the introduction of the birth control pill, 
pointing to an important role of the birth control pill in the evolution of the divorce rate 
since the late 1950s. This is consistent with the use of different measures of divorce 
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rates; the two main standard measures used are annual divorces per 1,000 married 
individuals, and annual divorces per 1,000 individuals.  
Our findings contribute to the growing literature on the impact of oral 
contraception on several socio-economic variables. Several papers have pointed to 
access to the birth control pill as an important determinant of the decline in post-1960 
US fertility (Bailey 2006, 2009, 2010; Guldi, 2008). Other researchers have studied the 
effect of the birth control pill on female labour force participation (Goldin and Katz, 
2000 and 2002), female education (Ananat and Hungerman 2011; Hock 2007; Pezzini 
2005), marriage (Edlund and Machado 2011; Christensen 2012), cohabitation 
(Christensen 2012), welfare (Pezzini 2005) and even on children’s outcomes (Ananat 
and Hungerman 2011; Pantano 2007). We add to the existing literature by providing 
supplemental evidence suggesting that our results are not driven by unobserved state-
specific factors, time-varying factors at the state level, variations in early legal access to 
the pill, the liberalization of divorce laws, or reforms in the aftermath of divorce. 
We include controls for unobserved determinants at the state level that may be 
correlated with divorce, such as slow-moving demographic trends and/or changing 
social norms. In addition, we include observable factors that appear to be related to 
divorce, such as female labour force participation. It is also arguable that the 
coefficients capturing the effect of sales bans may be measuring the response of divorce 
rates to changes in early legal access to the birth control pill, in addition to - or instead 
of - the effect of the sales bans on divorce. To examine this issue, we incorporate in our 
main specification controls for legislative variations, across states, on the timing of 
early legal access to the birth control pill using information from Bailey (2006). After 
introducing these controls, the estimated coefficients picking up the impact of the birth 
control pill change very little. 
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As an additional check that variations in the sales bans of birth control pill are 
driving the evolution of divorce rates since the late 1950s, we analyze the differential 
evolution of divorce rates between states with and without sales bans. Since one 
interpretation of our results is that the increase in the divorce rates in states without 
sales bans is simply due to factors unrelated to differences in the Comstock statutes; if 
this were the case, then differences in divorce rates might be maintained, even as states 
revised their statutes in the aftermath of the Griswold decision that led to the lifting of 
the ban on the use of contraceptives. Our findings show that, five years after the 
Griswold decision, the difference in divorce rates between those states with and without 
sales bans decreases, indicating that our results are not driven by forces other than the 
variations of the Comstock anti-obscenity statutes. 
In the final section, we examine whether taking into account the birth control pill 
effects reduces the impact of divorce law reforms on divorce rates. The liberalization of 
the divorce law reforms began some years after the introduction of the birth control pill, 
and it is possible to argue that prior analysis of the effect of divorce law reforms may be 
measuring the response of divorce rates to both divorce law reforms and the 
introduction of the birth control pill. To analyse this issue, we introduce controls for 
divorce laws that regulate how to get a divorce, in addition to controls for laws that 
govern living arrangements in the period subsequent to divorce, which also have an 
impact on the evolution of divorce rates in the subsequent decades (Nixon 1997; Brinig 
and Buckley 1998; González-Val and Marcén 2011). We find that the effects of divorce 
law reforms do not vary.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the 
empirical strategy, Section III describes the data; baseline results and robustness checks 
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are discussed in Section IV, in Section V we analyse whether the effects of divorce law 
reforms are maintained, and Section VI sets out our main conclusions. 
 
II. Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical approach makes use of the differences in the language of the Comstock 
statutes, enacted in 48 states in the US during the late 1800s and early 1900s, to identify 
the effect of the birth control pill on divorce rates. 1  This identification strategy was 
previously used by Bailey (2010) to ascertain the role of the birth control pill in the 
evolution of the US fertility rate. As Bailey (2010) explained, obviously, the Comstock 
anti-obscenity laws were not passed to control the use of the birth control pill, but they 
did have a significant impact on access to contraceptives several decades later. Among 
the states that passed those laws, 30 statutes explicitly considered contraception as an 
obscenity and 24 banned the sales of contraceptive supplies. 2 Then, when Enovid, the 
birth control pill, was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the 
regulation of menses, and 3 years later, in 1960, as an oral contraceptive, its access was 
clearly limited. As shown in Bailey (2010), sales bans significantly reduced the use of 
the birth control pill in states with those restrictions. Of course, we certainly recognize 
that differences in social norms, states’ judiciary, and legislatures, could result in 
differences in the application of these laws but, as in Bailey (2010), we favour the use of 
the variation in the language of Comstock laws to measure the effects of the birth 
control pill. 
To begin with, the estimation strategy enables a difference-in-differences 
approach. The following equation forms the empirical framework of our analysis: 
                                                 
1 There is no information on Comstock laws in the case of Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii, see Bailey 
(2010). Then, those states are not considered in our analysis. 
2 These laws are coded in Bailey (2010). 
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Divorce rates,t = βSales banss,t + Σs State fixed Effectss + Σt Time fixed Effectst + 
 [Σs States*Timet + Σs States*Time2t] + εs,t      (1) 
 
where Sales banss,t is a dummy variable equal to “1” when a state s had a sales ban of 
the birth control pill in year t, and 0 otherwise. The parameter β is interpreted as the 
average difference in the divorce rate in states with sales bans, versus the comparison 
group (see the discussion below). From a theoretical point of view, as mentioned above, 
if the use of the birth control pill makes divorce more attractive for women, then the 
sign of this β-parameter should be negative. The birth control pill diminishes the 
marginal costs of preventing births and so, for some women, it should lead to a 
reduction in the number of children born per woman, reducing the value of marriage 
(Goldin and Katz 2000; 2002). The birth control pill also helps women to maintain their 
attachment to the labour force and their human capital, which also makes divorce more 
attractive (Goldin and Katz 2000; 2002). Thus, those states with sales bans, which 
reduce the diffusion of this oral contraceptive (Bailey 2010), are expected to have lower 
divorce rates. 
However, the birth control pill may also increase the value of marriage since it 
can have a positive impact on the number of births by eliminating the risk of 
overshooting, (Bailey 2010), or by improved sorting of young women at marriage, 
(Goldin and Katz 2000;2002). Then, the sign of β is theoretically ambiguous. Equation 
(1) also includes state fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for evolving 
unobserved state-level characteristics, and linear and quadratic trends, which allow us to 
capture trends in state-level unobserved attributes affecting divorce. The inclusion of 
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those controls is quite common in the economic literature on divorce, (see, for example, 
Friedberg 1998, Wolfers 2006, González-Val and Marcén 2011). 
 
III. Data 
We utilize data on divorce for the period 1950 to 2000. The divorce rate is defined as 
the annual number of divorces per 1,000 married individuals. We acknowledge that this 
is not the standard measure of divorce (because of availability problems), though the 
population ‘at risk of divorce’ is considered appropriately with this measure.3 We obtain 
the stock of married people in order to calculate this rate for the years in which the 
decennial US census was conducted.4 Yearly data was reckoned by linear interpolation. 
The annual number of divorces comes from Vital Statistics of the United States, and 
Wolfers (2006). 
Figure 1 plots the divorce rate, measured as annual divorces per 1,000 married 
individuals in the US. From 1950 to 1958, the US divorce rate slightly decreases, 
reaching the lowest rate in the period analysed of around 4 divorces per 1,000 married 
individuals, and there is then an increase in the divorce rate from 1959 until 1976. This 
period can be divided in two parts because of the differences in the rate of growth of the 
divorce rate, one until the late 1960s and the other from the late 1960s to 1976 when the 
divorce rate slopes steeply. That is followed by a stable period around a rate of 11 
divorces per 1,000 married individuals. This stability terminates in the early 1980s, and 
since then we observe a smooth decline that continues until the end of our sample in 
2000. The evolution of the divorce rate described here is not restricted to this specific 
measure of divorce. The standard definition of divorce, also plotted in Figure 1, the 
                                                 
3 We also run all the analysis using the crude divorce rate, see below. Results do not substantially vary. 
4 This information was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2010). 
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crude divorce rate (annual number of divorces per 1,000 individuals), displays a quite 
similar behaviour. 
This quick glance at the temporal evolution of the divorce rates appears to show 
the presence of a potential causal relationship between the diffusion of the birth control 
pill (Enovid), approved in 1957, and the increase in the divorce rate. This relationship is 
also reflected in Figure 2, representing the evolution of the average divorce rate across 
states with differences in the state-specific language of the Comstock anti-obscenity 
laws. We have included the average divorce rate of those states that prohibited the sale 
of any article, instrument, or medicine for the prevention of conception (24 states), and 
the average divorce rate of those without sales bans on contraceptive methods (24 
states). The short-dashed line shows the evolution of the difference in the average 
divorce rate between those states that implemented sales bans versus those that did not 
establish such bans. We observe that the increase in the average divorce rate occurs in 
those states that did not introduce sales bans until the Griswold decision, and so it seems 
this restriction is relevant in the evolution of the divorce rate.  
Despite the rise in the divorce rate in those states that did not explicitly introduce 
sales bans in their statutes, it is worth noting that it is not clear whether some of these 
states (mainly those located in the south) did not intentionally mention the prevention of 
conception in their Comstock laws, or whether they did not introduce it since there 
existed older statutes prohibiting the “corruption of morals”, regulating the prevention 
of conception, as Bailey (2010) explained. To avoid this problem, we consider in our 
main analysis only those states that made any reference to prevention of conception in 
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their Comstock statutes (29 states), although, for consistency, we have also repeated the 
analysis by including the rest of the States in the comparison group (18 states). 5 
 
IV. Results 
A. Baseline Regression 
Table 1 presents the estimates for Equation (1). In column (1), incorporating state and 
year fixed effects, divorce rates are significantly lower in those states with sales bans 
relative to those without sales bans. As can be seen in columns (2) and (3), this is 
supported even after introducing state-specific linear and quadratic time trends, 
although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the sales ban in those columns 
varies somewhat. This may be because we are removing not only state fixed attributes 
but also time-varying unobservable state-level characteristics that could bias the 
empirical findings shown in column (1).  
To test whether our results are sensitive to our definition of divorce, we ran a 
quite simple robustness check. As mentioned above, we have also repeated the analysis 
using an additional dependent variable, the crude divorce rate, defined as the number of 
annual divorces per 1,000 individuals. Results are displayed in Table A (see Appendix 
A) that shows that, despite the small change in the magnitude of the impact of our 
variable of interest (this is not surprising since the denominator of the dependent 
variable has changed), we can still observe a negative and significant effect of sales 
bans on divorce. Then, sales bans of the birth control pill seem to be relevant in the 
evolution of the divorce rate. 
                                                 
5 As suggested in Halla (2011), we have excluded Nevada since the evolution of the divorce rate in this state is quite 
different to the rest of the states. As a robustness check, we ran all the analysis including Nevada and results are 
maintained. 
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The interpretation of prior results may be a touch problematic since, in previous 
analysis, we have considered that all States repealed or amended their Comstock anti-
obscenity statutes in 1970. We do that since almost all states removed their sales bans 
on contraception to married individuals by the year 1970 (Pilper and Wechsler 1969; 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 1974). However, as Bailey (2010) 
mentioned, it is not clear whether the decisions of those states were responses to the 
Griswold decision, (that decision imposed a provision in Connecticut’s 1879 law, other 
States across the US responded by repealing or amending their Comstock anti-obscenity 
statutes in the subsequent years, (Bailey 2010)), since there were some state programs 
that subsidized family planning before the date on which state sales bans on 
contraception were repealed. Then, for instance, if states that repealed sales bans in year 
t-2 are being classified as states with sales bans in year t, this could lead to a bias in the 
estimates of the impact of sales bans on divorce. To examine this issue, we have re-run 
all the analysis by considering that sales bans were repealed in different years, (1965, 
1967, 1975 and, 1980). Results are presented in Table B, Appendix B. As can be seen, 
in all cases, the estimated coefficients are negative and significant; thus, those states 
with sales bans had lower divorce rates. Note that the magnitude of the effect varies 
somewhat, especially when we assume that all sales bans were repealed in 1965. But, 
this is not striking; since, in this case, our estimates are clearly biased, we are 
categorizing some states that rescinded sales bans later as states that repealed their 
statutes in year 1965. For the rest of the estimates, we observe that the impact of the 
sales bans on divorce was around 0.5-0.6 divorces per 1,000 married population. As 
expected, the differences in divorce rates seem to be mitigated in absolute value as 
times goes by, which coincides with the removal of sales bans. 
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As an additional robustness check, we consider all states in our analysis. 6 It 
might bias our results since it is not clear whether some states did not intentionally 
introduce the prevention of conception in their Comstock laws (see above). After 
including all states, our estimates are not significant, albeit negative when we add state 
and year fixed effects and state-specific quadratic time trends, columns (1) and (3). 
Thus, it seems that, in this case, sales bans of the birth control pill do not matter. 
However, plotting the residuals from the specifications presented in Table 2, it is 
observed that, in this case, not only quadratic trends but also cubic trends need to be 
added to pick up the impact of the sales bans because of the trending behaviour of the 
residuals (see a similar analysis in Friedberg (1998)). The inclusion of these state-
specific trends can be justified to address omitted variables bias. We revisit this issue 
below. After including cubic trends, column (4), we again obtain a negative and 
significant coefficient suggesting that those states with sales bans had lower divorce 
rates. 7 Although we acknowledge that these estimates may be biased, it is comforting 
that our results are maintained. 
 
B. Is it sales bans, or is it the increase in female labour force 
participation? 
Since an increase in the divorce rate can also be attributed to a rise in female labour 
force participation (Allen 1998; Bremmer and Kesselring 2004; Nunley and Kietz 
2009), it is possible to argue that its effect, which is correlated with the outcome of 
interest, if omitted, would be captured by the coefficients measuring the effect of the 
                                                 
6 As explained above, Nevada is also excluded in this case. 
7 Prior analysis that excludes those states that did not mention prevention of conception in their statutes, has also been 
repeated including cubic trends. However, in this case, the analysis of the residuals points to the specification that 
includes state-specific quadratic trends to address the omitted variable bias. All these figures are available upon 
request. 
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sales bans. To tackle this issue, we provide additional evidence to ascertain that our 
empirical findings are not driven by omitted variables. We add female labour force 
participation (FLFP) to the baseline regression. Data on FLFP at the state level come 
from the Current Population Survey and from the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (gaps were filled by linear interpolation).  
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the regression results of Equation (1) after adding 
FLFP as a control. In this specification, the effect of the sales bans is still negative and 
significant. The coefficient capturing the effect of FLFP, as expected, is positive and 
significant. Results on our variable of interest do not vary. In the second column, we 
have also included a quadratic term for FLFP. Although, to our knowledge, there is no 
existing literature finding a nonlinear relationship between divorce and FLFP, some 
works have suggested that this relationship exists between FLFP and other outcomes 
such as the Total Fertility Rate, (Ahn and Mira 2002). Thus, as an additional check, we 
have also added this quadratic term to our specification. Results do not change, column 
(2), and the coefficients capturing the impact of FLFP are no longer significant. Then, it 
seems that there is not a quadratic relationship between them.  
We acknowledge that we have not included in the analysis other factors of 
divorce suggested in the literature, which may be different by state but have little to do 
with the sales bans of the birth control pill. The inclusion of these may be problematic 
since, as Allen (2002) suggested, many of the measures of economic performance, such 
as female earnings and even FLFP, or other demographic attributes such as fertility 
rates, have not been truly exogenous. Indeed, Becker (1981) explained that causality 
between these variables and the divorce rate may run in both directions. Thus, because 
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of endogeneity concerns, we prefer not to include them in the rest of the analysis, 
although, as shown previously, results are unchanged after adding, for example, FLFP. 8 
 
C. Is it sales bans, or is it other reforms? 
While sales bans on contraception could affect the diffusion of the birth control pill in 
the US, other US regulations, such as the liberalization of access to this oral 
contraceptive for young women, could also have an impact on the diffusion of the birth 
control pill. As shown in Goldin and Katz (2002), access to the birth control pill has a 
negative effect on the share of college women currently divorced. Therefore, one can 
argue that the effect of sales bans may be confounded with changes in early legal access 
to the pill. To explore this issue, we include in our baseline regression a dummy 
variable to control for the changes in the early legal access to the pill, using information 
from Bailey (2006). This variable is defined as follows: it takes the value “1” when a 
state s has a law that allows unmarried, childless women under 21 to legally obtain the 
birth control pill without parental, and 0 otherwise. 
Results are presented in column (3) of Table 3. Again, the relationship between 
the sales bans and the divorce rate is negative and significant, although coefficients are 
slightly lower in absolute value. With respect to the changes in early legal access to the 
birth control pill, it is observed that parameters are not significant. 9 These results should 
be viewed with caution, since our dependent variable is defined as the annual number of 
divorces per 1,000 married individuals. Then, we incorporate a sub-population that is 
not affected by changes in the early legal access to the birth control pill, (those already 
married when the reforms took place). Because of that, and since our results do not vary 
                                                 
8 Note that all the analysis has also been run after including FLFP and results are maintained. 
9 Our findings remain unchanged even if we only introduce state and year fixed effects or state-specific linear trends. 
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by much, we prefer not to include the early legal access to the pill in the rest of the 
analysis. 10 
While the Comstock statutes were repealed or amended, there was another wave 
of reforms that could drive the behaviour of the divorce rate since the late 1960s. This 
potential determinant of divorce is the liberalization of the divorce laws (Friedberg 1998; 
Wolfers 2006; González-Val and Marcén 2011). This is relevant since, in that period, 
many states passed new divorce laws that made divorce easier; for instance, in the 
period 1969 to 1971, 11 states approved divorce law reforms (Friedberg, 1998). Thus, it 
is possible to claim that our estimated points are confounding both effects: the effect of 
divorce law reforms and the effect of sales bans. To tackle this issue, we run the next 
equation:  
 
Divorce rates,t = βSales banss,t + Σk  δkReforms,t,k+Σs State fixed Effectss +  
+Σt Time fixed Effectst + [Σs States*Timet + Σs States*Time2t] + εs,t   (2) 
 
where we control for the response of divorce rates to divorce law reform, à la Wolfers, 
Wolfers (2006). Reforms,t,k  is a set of dummy variables equal to “1” when the state s has 
implemented a new divorce law regime in year t for k periods, and “0” otherwise. By 
including these dummies, the entire dynamic response of divorce to divorce law reforms 
is supposed to be captured. The remaining variables are defined as in equation (1). In 
column (4) of Table 3, we show the estimates of interest for Equation (2). Once more, 
results do not vary. We still observe a negative and significant effect of sales bans on 
divorce after adding controls for the liberalization of divorce law reforms. Finally, we 
have also introduced in a specification all controls to check whether our results 
                                                 
10 We repeated all the analysis adding controls for the variations in early legal access to the pill and results do not 
vary substantially. 
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remained unchanged. The fifth column in Table 3 reports these estimates. Again, our 
empirical findings do not vary substantially, though the magnitude of the effect of sales 
bans declines slightly in absolute value. Thus, our findings suggest that the impact of 
the birth control pill on divorce is relevant. 
 
D. Differential Evolution of the Divorce Rate 
As previously explained, one interpretation of our results is that the increase in the 
divorce rates in states with sales bans simply occurred for reasons unrelated to 
differences in the language of the Comstock statutes. If this were the case, then 
differences in divorce rates might not be mitigated, even if states repealed or revised 
their statutes in the aftermath of the Griswold decision. To probe this further, following 
Bailey (2010), we use an alternative strategy estimating the short-run and long-run 
differences between those states with and without sales bans. 11 We estimate the next 
expression: 
 
Divorce rates,t = Sales banss,t f ‘t β+ Σs State fixed Effectss + Σt Time fixed Effectst+ 
 +[Σs States*Timet + Σs States*Time2t] + εs,t    (3) 
 
with f ‘t =(1, 1(t=1951),…,1(t=1980)), the remaining variables remain as in equation (1). 
In this case, β parameters capture changes in the gap in divorce rates in states with sales 
bans, relative to those without sales bans, in the period considered, from 1951 to 1980. 
A negative sign of the β parameter indicates that the divorce rate in state s with a sales 
                                                 
11 The methodology used earlier only identifies discrete series break. 
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ban was lower in year t than that in a state without sales bans. The interpretation of a 
positive sign would be just the opposite. 
Figure 3 plots our estimates of the β coefficients of Equation (3) and the 95% 
confidence interval, including state and year fixed effects, state-specific linear trends, 
and also quadratic trends. As explained above, those β parameters capture changes in 
the gap in divorce rates in states with sales bans, relative to those without sales bans. In 
the early and mid-1950s, the gap in divorce rates is not statistically significant. After the 
approval of Enovid to regulate the menses in 1957, coefficients are statistically 
significant and with little variation in their magnitude until the early 1960s. Since then, 
we observe that the gap in the divorce rate between those states with and without sales 
bans considerable increased, with those with sales bans having much lower divorce 
rates. After 1970, the gap in the divorce rate decreases until 1980. The fact that sales 
bans on contraception are associated with lower divorce rates since the 1960s, and that 
those differences decreased since the 1970s, is consistent with their increasing relevance 
in step with the approval of its use as a contraceptive in 1960, and the decline in 
importance of the sales bans since 1970, when almost all states had eliminated that 
prohibition. Results remain unchanged, even if we re-define f ‘t  to consider differences 
in divorce rates due to sales bans until 1970, and then until 1975. Additionally, we have 
repeated this analysis including all controls (see Figure 4). The behaviour of the gap in 
the divorce rate between those states with and without sales bans, described above, is 
maintained. All in all, our results suggest that sales bans on the birth control pill played 
an important role in the evolution of US divorce rates. 
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V. The effect on divorce of the divorce law reforms 
Up to this point, we have empirically analysed the effect on the divorce rate of banning 
the birth control pill. In this section, we examine whether considering the birth control 
pill impact reduces the effect of divorce law reforms on divorce rates. Both changes 
were implemented, in many states, at about the same time during the 1960s and 1970s, 
so that it can be argued that prior analysis of the effect of divorce law reform on divorce 
rates (such as Friedberg 1998; Wolfers 2006; González-Val and Marcén 2010) may be 
measuring the response of divorce rates to the advent of the pill, in addition to, or 
instead of, the response of divorce rates to changes in divorce laws. 
We test this by comparing the effect of no-fault unilateral divorce reforms on 
divorce rates, with and without controls for sales bans. Our results are shown in Table 4 
where the variables capturing the effect of the divorce law reforms are introduced à la 
Wolfers, (Wolfers 2006), as in Equation (2). Columns (1) to (3) show the estimates 
without the sales ban variable, and columns (4) to (6) with the sales ban variable. We 
can see that coefficients measuring the effect of divorce law reforms change vary little 
after including sales bans as controls. Column (7) reports our estimates after including 
controls for law reforms concerning the aftermath of divorce, which may also have an 
impact on the evolution of divorce rates in subsequent decades (Nixon 1997; and Brinig 
and Buckley 1998; González-Val and Marcén 2010; Halla 2011). We introduce two 
main policy changes, as in González-Val and Marcén (2011), that have swept the U.S. 
since the late 1970s: the approval of the joint-custody regime, and the Child Support 
Enforcement program. Data come from Leo (2008) and González-Val and Marcén 
(2011). Even after adding all those controls, we find similar results: the effects of the 
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divorce law reforms do not change. 12 However, in contrast with existing works on the 
impact of divorce law reforms on divorce rates that find permanent effects, we simply 
observe that divorce law reforms have a positive and significant impact on divorce rates, 
two years after their introduction. This may be due to the fact that our sample only 
contains a portion of states (29 states) rather than all the states as in other studies. If we 
are considering many states that did not pass reforms, or those in which the impact of 
the reform was lower, our results could be biased. Then, it is possible to argue that, due 
to this sample selection problem, our results are not comparable with previous works.  
Finally, Table 5 shows our results after including all the states.13 In the first 
column, we see that all coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting a permanent 
response of divorce rates to divorce law reforms. When we add the sales ban dummy in 
column (2), results do not change. The coefficient capturing the impact of sales bans on 
divorce is negative and significant, albeit just at the 10% level, even after adding only 
state-specific quadratic trends. 14 Thus, results suggest that sales bans do not affect the 
subsequent response of divorce rates to divorce law reforms. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the role of the birth control pill on US divorce 
rate. Since women using the birth control pill can easily decide when, and whether, to 
have children, and whether or not to maintain their attachment to the labour force 
(which makes divorce more attractive), we would expect a negative impact of sales bans 
                                                 
12 The number of observations is lower in the case of column (7) since there is only information until 1998 for one of 
the Child Support Enforcement variables that we have introduced, see González-Val and Marcén (2011). 
13 Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii and Nevada are also excluded here, as explained above. 
14 In the analysis presented in Table 2, we only obtain significant results when adding cubic trends. After adding the 
divorce law reform variables, we get better results on the effect of the birth control pill on divorce, introducing State-
specific quadratic time trends. Then, cubic trends could be capturing the effect of these omitted variables in Table 2. 
In this case, we should recognize that these estimates are biased, since it is not clear whether some of the States in the 
comparison group regulated prevention of conception issues in earlier statutes. 
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of the contraceptive pill on divorce. To explore this issue, we utilize data from the US 
for the period from 1950 to 2000. 
Our empirical findings indicate that sales bans have a negative impact on 
divorce, irrespective of the measure of divorce rate considered. We further provide 
additional empirical evidence showing that our findings are picking up the effect of 
banning the birth control pill rather than the impact of omitted variables. The 
relationship between divorce rates and sales bans is consistent with the inclusion of 
controls for female labour force participation, with changes in the early legal access to 
the pill, and with the liberalization of the divorce laws. All these findings are quite 
robust after adding controls for unobserved state-specific attributes, and time-varying 
attributes at the state level. 
Moreover, we examine the evolution of the divorce rate gap between states 
having, or not, introduced sales bans. We find that sales bans of the birth control pill are 
related to lower divorce rates since the 1960s, and that those differences decrease since 
the 1970s. This is consistent with the increasing relevance of the birth control pill with 
the approval of its use as a contraceptive in 1960 and the decrease in the importance of 
the sales bans since 1970, when almost all states had repealed or amended their 
regulations on banning the sales of the birth control pill. 
Finally, we explore whether considering the effects of the advent of the birth 
control pill diminishes, or even annuls, the impact of divorce law reforms on divorce 
rates. Both changes were implemented in many states quite close to each other in time, 
so that, it is arguable that prior work on the impact of divorce law reforms on divorce 
rates may be measuring the response of divorce rates to the pill, in addition to or instead 
of the response of divorce rates to the implementation of the new divorce legal regimes. 
Our clear finding is that, although sales bans are relevant, the impact of divorce law 
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reforms remains unaffected even after the introduction of an extensive number of 
potential explanations that could also be responsible for the evolution of the divorce rate 
in the US. 
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Table 1- THE EFFECT OF SALES BANS ON DIVORCE 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Basic 
specification
State-
specific 
State-
specific 
  
linear 
trends 
quadratic 
trends 
    
Sales Ban -0.470*** -0.311* -0.645*** 
 (0.151) (0.170) (0.138) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes 
Observations 1413 1413 1413 
R-squared 0.930 0.950 0.964 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of 
married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information 
on total married population was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married 
population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Significant at the *** 1% level; 
** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
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Table 2- THE EFFECT OF SALES BANS ON DIVORCE CONSIDERING ALL 
STATES 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Basic 
specification
State-
specific 
State-
specific 
State-
specific 
  
linear 
trends 
quadratic 
trends 
cubic 
trends 
     
Sales Ban -0.074 0.044 -0.091 -0.263** 
 (0.119) (0.109) (0.103) (0.132) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes Yes 
State * timecb No No No Yes 
Observations 2314 2314 2314 2314 
R-squared 0.921 0.949 0.964 0.970 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of 
married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information 
on total married population was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married 
population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Significant at the *** 1% level; 
 ** 5% level, and * 10% level  
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Table 3- THE EFFECT OF SALES BANS ON DIVORCE AFTER ADDING 
CONTROLS 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Sales Ban -0.614*** -0.615*** -0.633*** -0.657*** -0.597***
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.130) (0.132) 
FLFP 0.024* 0.042   0.039***
 (0.014) (0.047)   (0.014) 
FLFP square  -0.016    
  (0.039)    
Early Legal Access   -0.100  -0.091 
   (0.178)  (0.180) 
Years Unilateral Divorce No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * timesq Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1413 1413 1413 1413 1413 
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.965 0.966 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of 
married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information 
on total married population was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married 
population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Divorce laws coded by Wolfers 
(2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml. Female Labour Force Participation (FLFP) is from the 
the Current Population Survey and from the Integrated Public Use Microdata (gaps were filled by linear 
interpolation). Early Legal Access coded by Bailey (2006). Significant at the *** 1% level; ** 5% level, and * 10% 
level. 
.
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Table 4- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM  
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Basic specification State-specific State-specific Basic specification State-specific State-specific State-specific 
  linear trends quadratic trends  linear trends quadratic trends quadratic trends 
Sales Ban    -0.451*** -0.371** -0.657*** -0.628*** 
    (0.143) (0.150) (0.130) (0.134) 
First 2 years 0.832*** 0.630* 0.486* 0.863*** 0.651* 0.516* 0.496* 
 (0.319) (0.346) (0.283) (0.323) (0.349) (0.288) (0.292) 
Years 3-4 0.519** 0.286 0.137 0.533** 0.291 0.141 0.150 
 (0.209) (0.259) (0.224) (0.209) (0.260) (0.228) (0.238) 
Years 5-6 0.424** 0.171 0.041 0.438** 0.175 0.044 0.136 
 (0.206) (0.268) (0.229) (0.204) (0.268) (0.228) (0.254) 
Years 7-8 0.581*** 0.316 0.237 0.595*** 0.318 0.241 0.392 
 (0.188) (0.278) (0.236) (0.183) (0.277) (0.229) (0.284) 
Years 9-10 -0.070 -0.341 -0.340 -0.056 -0.340 -0.334 -0.214 
 (0.161) (0.296) (0.267) (0.157) (0.296) (0.262) (0.366) 
Years 11-12 -0.546*** -0.819** -0.713** -0.532*** -0.821** -0.705** -0.525 
 (0.174) (0.327) (0.296) (0.169) (0.326) (0.287) (0.355) 
Years 13-14 -0.821*** -1.093*** -0.869*** -0.806*** -1.096*** -0.855*** -0.655* 
 (0.165) (0.342) (0.312) (0.159) (0.341) (0.304) (0.395) 
Years 15 -0.958*** -1.165*** -0.617* -0.940*** -1.173*** -0.593 -0.369 
    Onwards (0.139) (0.383) (0.371) (0.139) (0.384) (0.364) (0.476) 
Controls        
Years Joint Custody No No No No No No Yes 
CSE variables No No No No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Observations 1413 1413 1413 1413 1413 1413 1361 
R-squared2 0.937 0.953 0.965 0.937 0.953 0.965 0.969 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual 
number of divorces per 1,000 of married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information on total married population was obtained 
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Divorce laws coded by Wolfers 
(2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml. Joint Custody laws were coded by Leo (2008). Data on CSE come from González-Val and Marcén (2011). Significant at the *** 
1% level; ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
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Table 5- DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF UNILATERAL REFORM CONSIDERING ALL 
STATES 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) 
 State-specific State-specific 
 quadratic trends quadratic trends 
Sales Ban  -0.195* 
  (0.100) 
First 2 years 0.684*** 0.700*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) 
Years 3-4 0.657*** 0.661*** 
 (0.184) (0.185) 
Years 5-6 0.781*** 0.779*** 
 (0.190) (0.191) 
Years 7-8 1.073*** 1.069*** 
 (0.217) (0.218) 
Years 9-10 0.877*** 0.871*** 
 (0.256) (0.257) 
Years 11-12 0.660** 0.659** 
 (0.264) (0.264) 
Years 13-14 0.588** 0.589** 
 (0.284) (0.283) 
Years 15 0.876** 0.880** 
Onwards (0.345) (0.344) 
Controls   
Years Joint Custody Yes Yes 
CSE variables Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes 
State * time Yes Yes 
State * timesq Yes Yes 
Observations 2226 2226 
R-squared 0.968 0.968 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of 
married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information 
on total married population was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married 
population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Divorce laws coded by Wolfers 
(2006), see http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml. Joint Custody laws were coded by Leo (2008). Data on 
CSE come from González-Val and Marcén (2011).  Significant at the *** 1% level; ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
31 
 
 
Unilateral Divorce
Enovid
Griswold decision
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
R
at
e
19
50
19
52
19
54
19
56
19
58
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
Annual divorces per 1,000 individuals
Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals
Source: Vital Statistics of the United States and  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
Figure 1: Divorce Rate in the U.S. (1950-2000)
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Appendix A 
 
Table A- THE EFFECT OF SALES BANS ON DIVORCE USING CDR 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Basic 
specification
State-
specific 
State-
specific 
  
linear 
trends 
quadratic 
trends 
    
Sales Ban -0.197*** -0.176*** -0.303*** 
 (0.059) (0.063) (0.058) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
State * time No Yes Yes 
State * timesq No No Yes 
Observations 1413 1413 1413 
R-squared 0.941 0.964 0.975 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Divorce rate data and 
population weights are from the Vital Statistics of the United States and from Wolfers (2006), 
http://bpp.wharton.upenn.edu/jwolfers/data.shtml. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Significant at the *** 1% 
level; ** 5% level, and * 10% level. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B- THE EFFECT OF SALES BANS ON DIVORCE CONSIDERING THAT 
SALES BAN WAS REPEALED IN 1965, 1967, 1975, AND 1980 
(Dependent variable: Annual divorces per 1,000 married individuals) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Sales Ban -0.449*** -0.584*** -0.564*** -0.562***
 (0.154) (0.139) (0.137) (0.143) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * time Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State * timesq Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1413 1413 1413 1413 
R-squared 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.964 
Notes: Estimated using state population weights (equal to the denominator of the dependent variable). Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is defined as the annual number of divorces per 1,000 of 
married population. Data on annual divorces come from the Vital Statistics of the United States and the information 
on total married population was obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. Yearly data on married 
population was calculated by linear interpolation. Sales bans coded by Bailey (2010). Sales bans variable takes the 
value 1 when a state has sales bans and 0 when they do not. In columns (1) to (4), it is considered that all sales bans 
were repealed them in 1965, 1967, 1975, 1980, respectively. Significant at the *** 1% level; ** 5% level, and * 10% 
level. 
 
 
